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NOTES
THE FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS, THE
FIRST AMENDMENT, AND COMMERCIAL
SPEECH: A CALL FOR CONSISTENCY
In light of the Supreme Court's increasingly expansive inter-
pretation of the first amendment,' particularly in the area of com-
mercial speech,2 the issue has arisen whether the federal securities
laws can withstand current first amendment scrutiny.3 Indeed, one
' U.S. CONsT. amend. I. The first amendment provides in pertinent part: "Congress
shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press . . . ." Id. The
Supreme Court had not addressed first amendment issues until the Court developed the
"clear and present danger" doctrine in cases arising during World War I. J. NOWAK, R.
ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW 874-75 & n.12 (2d ed. 1983); see Abrams v.
United States, 250 U.S. 616, 618-19 (1919) (sustaining conviction for resisting war effort);
Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211, 216 (1919) (sustaining conviction for obstruction of
military recruitment services); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (sustaining
conviction under Espionage Act of 1917 for distributing leaflets critical of draft). Subse-
quently, however, the guarantee of free speech developed into this nation's most zealously
protected constitutional right. See, e.g., Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on
Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 381-82 (1973); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 115
(1943); Stonecipher, Safeguarding Speech and Press Guarantees: Preferred Position Postu-
late Reexamined, in THE FIRST AMENDMENT RECONSIDERED 89, 94-96 (1982). Justice Cardozo
recognized the preferred status of the first amendment as early as 1937 when he remarked
that freedom of speech and thought "is the matrix, the indispensable condition, of nearly
every other form of freedom." Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 326-27 (1937). The words
"preferred position" have been avoided by the Court during the past 35 years; however, the
vagueness and overbreadth doctrines, the rule against prior restraints, and requirements of
a "clear and present danger" or "actual malice" before speech may be punished exemplify
other "judicial tools" that the Court has developed to sustain the preferred status of free-
dom of speech. See generally J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra, at 864-65;
Stonecipher, supra, at 98-107.
2 See infra notes 25-48 and accompanying text.
3 See, e.g., SEC v. Suter, 732 F.2d 1294, 1299-1300 (7th Cir. 1984) (first amendment
raised as defense in SEC action for injunction under Investment Advisers Act of 1940); SEC
v. Lowe, 725 F.2d 892, 898-902 (2d Cir. 1984) (first amendment raised as defense in SEC
action for injunction under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940), cert. granted, 105 S. Ct.
81 (1984) (No. 83-1911); SEC v. Wall St. Publishing Inst., Inc., 591 F. Supp. 1070, 1080-81
(D.D.C. 1984) (discussing first amendment issues involved in regulation of investment ad-
vice magazine), motion for stay pending appeal granted, [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
91,635, at 99,219-20 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 10, 1984); In re W.T. Grant Co., [1980 Transfer
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first amendment authority has suggested that the enormous power
granted to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC or Com-
mission) by the federal securities laws presents the most serious
statutory regulation of speech.4 For example, requirements that is-
suers, brokers, and dealers be registered with the Commission
before they lawfully may engage in specified types of communica-
tion regarding securities5 resemble licensing schemes that in other
contexts have been struck down by the Supreme Court as prior
restraints." Statutory provisions that grant the Commission power
to review documents before they become "effective," or public,7
strengthened by the availability of criminal sanctions and SEC in-
junctions, essentially authorize the SEC to exercise the functions
of a censor," and thus present serious issues of prior restraint and
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 97,636, at 98,407-08 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 1980)
(first amendment discussed in private action to enjoin the communication of a proxy solici-
tation letter); Goodale, The First Amendment and Securities Act: A Collision Course?,
N.Y.L.J., April 8, 1983, at 1, col. 1 (analyzing district court opinion in Lowe and arguing
that the securities laws authorize unconstitutional prior restraints); Karmel, First Amend-
ment Questions Challenge the SEC, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 18, 1984, at 1, col. 1 (arguing that the
SEC often unconstitutionally restricts and chills free speech); see also Lewin, Business and
the Law: Commercial Free Speech, N.Y. Times, Feb. 7, 1984, at D2, col. 1 (discussion with
first amendment experts about ramifications of Lowe); Noble, Business and the Law: The
Licensing of Newsletters, N.Y. Times, Aug. 21, 1984, at D2, col. 1 (analysis of Wall St.
Publishing and Lowe cases); cf. Schoeman, Subscription Advisers, Blue Sky Registration
and the First Amendment, 33 Bus. LAW. 249, 249-56 (1977) (first amendment violated by
state blue sky regulation laws). One commentator has noted the "fundamental clash" be-
tween the securities laws and the first amendment, see Stephan, Highlights of the Mont-
gomery Ward Proxy Contest From a Lawyer's Viewpoint, Bus. LAW., Nov. 1955, at 86, 93-
95, and another the "inherent tension" between the two, see Fried, Convicted Analyst Gets
Right to Publish Advice, N.Y. Times, Feb. 2, 1983, at D1, col. 1, D19, col. 3 (quoting former
SEC commissioner Richard Smith).
" Goodale, supra note 3, at 1, col. 1. Floyd Abrams, a prominent first amendment prac-
titioner, remarked that "the SEC went too far" when it totally banned the publication of
investment newsletters in SEC v. Lowe, 725 F.2d 892, 902 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. granted, 105
S. Ct. 81 (1984) (No. 83-1911). See Lewin, supra note 3, at D2, col. 2. Similarly, James
Clayton, co-director of the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, accused the
Commission of "expand[ing] its jurisdiction beyond that intended by Congress and beyond
that authorized by the First Amendment." Noble, supra note 3, at D2, col. 2.
" For a discussion of first amendment issues raised by the registration provisions, see
infra notes 49-56 & 118-123 and accompanying text.
6 See infra note 14. In Jones v. SEC, 298 U.S. 1 (1936), the Supreme Court recognized
that registration is "in effect an ex parte application for a license." Id. at 22.
1 The word "effective" has been defined by the Supreme Court as connoting "complete-
ness of operative force and freedom to act." Jones v. SEC, 298 U.S. 1, 18 (1936). For a
discussion of SEC functions that entail reviewing documents, see infra notes 124-35 and
accompanying text.
I See infra note 15.
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"chilling."9
Although the Burger Court has been criticized for being too
restrictive in its interpretation of the first amendment, 0 freedom
of speech and press remains as expansive as ever." As currently
construed, the first amendment protects virtually all types of
speech. 2 Even unprotected classes of speech continue to benefit
from the Court's intolerance of prior restraints, 3 particularly when
I See Karmel, supra note 3, at 2, col. 5. "Chilling" is a form of self-censorship that
results when the legality of a contemplated speech or publication cannot readily be deter-
mined beforehand, causing the speaker to be deterred from communicating the message, or
to make only those statements that clearly will not be punishable. See New York Times Co.
v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 278-79 (1964); Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 153-54 (1959). For
a discussion of SEC "chilling," see infra note 129.
'0 See, e.g., Abrams, The Burger Court and the First Amendment: Putting a Decade
into Perspective-II. An Analysis, in THE FIRST AMENDMENT RECONSIDERED 138-43 (1982);
Emerson, First Amendment Doctrine and the Burger Court, 68 CALIF. L. REv. 422, 440-58
(1980); Meiklejohn, Commercial Speech and the First Amendment, 13 CAL. W.L. REV. 430,
431 (1977).
11 See Abrams, supra note 10, at 143; Emerson, supra note 10, at 422.
'2 See, e.g., Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 209-10 (1975) (ordinance
cannot forbid drive-in theatres from showing offensive films even where visible from public
street or public place); Papish v. Board of Curators, 410 U.S. 667, 670 (1973) (political car-
toon depicting a policeman raping the Statue of Liberty and the Goddess of Justice, and an
article entitled "M fL. Acquitted"); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971) (grant-
ing full protection to wearing in public a jacket that displayed the words "F_ the
Draft").
Notwithstanding the broad scope of the first amendment, some classes of speech have
been denied first amendment protection. See, e.g, Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 158-60
(1979) (defamatory speech); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23-24 (1973) (obscene speech);
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942) ("fighting words").
13 See, e.g., Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 570 (1976) (invalidating crim-
inal trial judge's order prohibiting news media from reporting anything "strongly implica-
tive" of defendant, despite judge's belief that order was necessary to ensure a fair trial);
New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (per curiam) (refusing to
enjoin publication of Pentagon Papers despite assertion by government that publication
would endanger national security); Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415,
419-20 (1971) (reversing injunction that had prevented distribution of leaflets critical of real
estate broker's business practices); Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70-71 (1963)
(holding unconstitutional practices of local committee that functioned to suppress sale and
circulation of objectionable literature); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 713-19 (1931) (in-
validating statutory "gag order" permitting injunctions against publication of malicious,
scandalous, and defamatory periodicals). The rule against prior restraints dates back at
least to Sir William Blackstone's criticism of the English censorship laws. See 4 W. BLACK-
STONE, COMMENTARIES 152; see also T. EMERSON, THE SYsTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
504 (1970). Indeed, it has been argued that the sole purpose of the first amendment was to
prevent prior restraint. See T. EMERSON, supra, at 504.
The Supreme Court has declared that "prior restraints on speech and publication are
the most serious and the least tolerable infringement on First Amendment rights." Ne-
braska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976). Thus, the Court has observed that
while subsequent punishment might "chill" speech, "prior restraint 'freezes' it at least for
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achieved through licensing 4 and censorship. 15 Moreover, the Bur-
ger Court has parted with precedent by enlarging the scope of first
the time." Id. (footnote omitted). The Court has warned repeatedly that prior restraints on
speech come to the Court with a "heavy presumption against" their constitutional validity.
E.g., New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (per curiam) (quoting
Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963)).
'4 See W. HACHTEN, THE SUPREME COURT ON FREEDOM OF THE PREss 72 (1968). Licens-
ing is the least tolerated form of speech restriction. Id. Indeed, the rule against prior re-
straints grew directly from governmental attempts to license the press. Emerson, The Doc-
trine of Prior Restraint, 20 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBs. 648, 662 (1955). In the leading case of
Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938), the Court held facially invalid an ordinance
that prohibited the distribution of circulars, handbooks, advertisements, or other literature
without first obtaining a permit from the city manager. See id. at 451. Such an ordinance,
the Court admonished, "strikes at the very foundation of the freedom of the press by sub-
jecting it to license and censorship. The struggle for the freedom of the press was primarily
directed against the power of the licensor." Id. The Court has noted that the defect in such
a licensing scheme "is not merely the sporadic abuse of power by the censor but the perva-
sive threat inherent in its very existence," and, thus, one need not prove abuse to challenge
the scheme. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97 (1940). In Schneider v. State, 308 U.S.
147 (1939), decided the year after Lovell, the Court held invalid as a prior restraint an
ordinance that required a permit for canvassing, and that allowed the Chief of Police to
refuse a permit where the applicant was "not of good character or [was] canvassing for a
project not free from fraud." Id. at 158, 165. The Schneider Court implied that any require-
ment of advance permission would be viewed as an unconstitutional prior restraint. See id.
at 160-65; Emerson, supra, at 663. For a more recent illustration of judicial intolerance of
licensing, see Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 149-51 (1969).
15 See W. HACHTEN, supra note 14, at 59 (censorship and prior restraint are "repug-
nant" under the Constitution, and the Supreme Court has made it increasingly difficult for
the official censor to do his job). In Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931), the Supreme
Court struck down a statute that permitted the prior restraint of malicious, scandalous, and
defamatory newspapers and periodicals. See id. at 701-02, 722-23. Chief Justice Hughes,
writing for the majority, noted that "liberty of the press, historically considered and taken
up by the Federal Constitution, has meant, principally although not exclusively, immunity
from previous restraints or censorship." Id. at 716. Justice Black also has labelled censor-
ship "the deadly enemy of freedom and progress. The plain language of the Constitution
forbids it." Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 160 (1959) (Black, J., concurring). Justice
Douglas, dissenting in Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 365 U.S. 43 (1961), decried
censorship because:
The regime of the censor is deadening. One who writes cannot afford entangle-
ments with the man whose pencil can keep his production from the market. The
result is a pattern of conformity. ...
Another evil of censorship is the ease with which the censor can erode liberty
of expression. One stroke of the pen is all that is needed. Under a censor's regime
the weights are cast against freedom. . . . [T]he censor . . . is given a presump-
tion of being correct. That advantage disappears when the government must wait
until a publication is made and then prove its case . . . in a public trial. ..
No more potent force . . .could be designed than censorship. It is a weapon
that no minority or majority group, acting through government, should be allowed
to wield over any of us.
Id. at 82-84 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted).
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amendment protection to include commercial speech.16 The Court,
however, has not extended full first amendment protection to com-
mercial speech,'7 and has left open the question of whether the
strict rule against prior restraint will apply to regulation of com-
mercial speech.' 8
It is suggested that the enormous authority granted to the
SEC under the securities laws is inconsistent with the Supreme
Court's current interpretation of the first amendment. It is sug-
gested further that no court has provided an adequate reconcilia-
tion of the interests represented in this conflict.19 Accordingly, this
Note will analyze the federal securities laws under current first
amendment law. After an initial examination of the Supreme
Court cases that have developed the law of commercial speech, 0
the Note will discuss and critique several recent cases in which
federal courts have considered, but rejected, first amendment de-
fenses against SEC enforcement of the Investment Advisers Act of
1940.21 The Note then will consider freedom of speech issues
presented by provisions in the Securities Act of 193322 and the Se-
"0 See infra notes 32-47 and accompanying text. Even those who have criticized the
present Court for interpreting the first amendment too narrowly have recognized the liberal
approach taken in commercial speech cases. See, e.g., Meiklejohn, supra note 10, at 431.
17 See, e.g., Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 103 S. Ct. 2875, 2879 (1983) (citing
Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 562-63 (1980) and
Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748,
771-72 n.24 (1976)). But see J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 1, at 923 (com-
mercial speech now seems to receive full protection).
"S Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 571 n.13
(1980) (citing Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,
425 U.S. 748, 771-72 n.24 (1976)).
" In the few securities cases in which the first amendment has been raised, the courts
generally have not given much consideration to the issue. See, e.g., Underhill Assocs., Inc. v.
Bradshaw, 674 F.2d 293, 296 (4th Cir. 1982) (one paragraph in opinion devoted to dismissal
of first amendment challenge to state registration statute); SEC v. Wall St. Transcript
Corp., 422 F.2d 1371, 1378-80 (2d Cir.) (rejecting first amendment challenge against Invest-
ment Advisers Act of 1940), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 958 (1970); Halsted v. SEC, 182 F.2d 660,
668-69 (D.C. Cir. 1950) (rejecting first amendment challenge against Public Utility Holding
Company Act of 1935).
20 See infra notes 25-48 and accompanying text.
21 SEC v. Suter, 732 F.2d 1294, 1299-1300 (7th Cir. 1984); SEC v. Lowe, 725 F.2d 892,
902 (2d Cir.1984), cert. granted, 105 S. Ct. 81 (1984) (No. 83-1911); SEC v. Wall St. Publish-
ing Inst. Inc., 591 F. Supp. 1070 (1984), motion for stay pending appeal granted, [Current]
FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 91,635, at 99,219-20 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 10, 1984); see infra notes 49-
93 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15
U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to 80b-21 (1982), see infra notes 49-55 and accompanying text.
22 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1982); see infra notes 120-22 & 125-30 and accompanying
1984]
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curities Exchange Act of 1934,23 and will conclude with the sugges-
tion that SEC prior restraint cannot be justified under present
constitutional standards.24
COMMERCIAL FREE SPEECH
Until recently, the Supreme Court recognized no protection
for purely commercial speech. In Valentine v. Chrestensen,5 the
Court sustained the constitutionality of a New York City ordi-
nance that completely prohibited the distribution of commercial
advertisement handbills, cards, and circulars in the streets.26 Jus-
tice Roberts, writing for a unanimous Court, stated unequivocally
that regulation of commercial advertising was a matter solely of
legislative judgment, subject to no first amendment restraint.2 Ap-
parently, the rationale behind the Court's holding was that com-
mercial advertising is motivated purely by economic self-interest,
and thus is more "durable" and less likely to be "chilled" than
other classes of speech.28 As a result of Valentine, legislatures were
free to regulate business advertising as they would other types of
business activity.2 9
Valentine subsequently was distinguished in cases involving
noncommercial advertising,30 but denial of first amendment pro-
22 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1982 & Supp. 1983); see infra notes 123 & 131-35 and accom-
panying text.
24 See infra notes 142-54 and accompanying text.
25 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
21 Id. at 55. The defendant in Valentine prepared and printed a handbill advertising a
United States Navy submarine he exhibited for profit. See id. at 52-53. The Court rejected
the defendant's argument that because the reverse side of his handbill contained a message
of protest against a city agency, the communication should be protected. Id. at 55.
21 Id. at 54.
28 See id. at 55; see also Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771-72 n.24 (1976). In footnote 24 of the Virginia Board opinion,
the Court noted the "commonsense differences" between commercial speech and other
speech, reasoning that since the communicator of the former necessarily has extensive
knowledge of his product, and is motivated by a desire for profit, a lesser degree of protec-
tion is necessary. 425 U.S. at 771-72 n.24; see also Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v.
Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 564 n.6 (1980) (noting factors that render commercial
speech "a hardy breed of expression").
29 See, e.g., Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 631-33, 641-45 (1951) (upholding as
valid exercise of police power an ordinance forbidding door-to-door solicitations of
magazines and periodicals).
20 In the landmark defamation case of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254
(1964), the Court accorded protection to a paid advertisement because it communicated
information, opinion, and grievances "of the highest public interest and concern." Id. at 266.
In Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975), the Court likewise distinguished the purely com-
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tection for purely commercial advertising remained the law for
over three decades."' In 1976, however, the Supreme Court over-
ruled this "highly paternalistic approach" in Virginia State Board
of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.3 2 In in-
validating a Virginia statute that prohibited pharmacists from ad-
vertising the prices of prescription drugs, the Court held that, as
long as it is truthful and concerns lawful activity, speech is not
wholly outside first amendment protection even if it does "no more
than propose a commercial transaction. ' 33 Purely economic motive,
the Court reasoned, should not of itself disqualify the speaker from
protection. 4 In a free market economy, it was observed, "the free
flow of commercial information is indispensable." 35 Therefore, par-
ticular consumers, and society as a whole, enjoy first amendment
rights to receive the information contained in commercial
advertisements. 6
Although the Virginia Board holding has not escaped criti-
cism,3 7 the Court has reaffirmed and expanded protection of com-
mercial advertisement in Valentine from protected public interest advertisement. See id. at
819-22. The abortion advertisement in Bigelow, the Court reasoned, contained sufficient fac-
tual information of general interest to deserve first amendment protection. Id. at 822.
3, See, e.g., Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S.
376, 384-85, 388-91 (1973) (rejecting first amendment challenge to ordinance forbidding
newspapers to carry gender-designated employment advertisements); Breard v. Alexandria,
341 U.S. 622, 641-45 (1951) (upholding ordinance forbidding door-to-door business solic-
itations).
32 425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976).
33 Id. at 762, 773 (quoting Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Rela-
tions, 413 U.S. 376, 385 (1973)).
" 425 U.S. at 762; cf. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964) (that
the publisher is paid for printing an advertisement does not, of itself, render the advertise-
ment commercial). Justice Stevens has observed that "even Shakespeare may have been
motivated by the prospect of pecuniary reward." Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub-
lic Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 580 (1980) (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment).
35 Virginia Board, 425 U.S. at 765.
36 Id. at 756-57, 763-65. The Virginia Board Court found that "[a]s to the particular
consumer's interest in the free flow of commercial information, that interest may be as keen,
if not keener by far, than his interest in the day's most urgent political debate." Id. at 763.
One commentator, in an influential article written before commercial speech was afforded
any protection, argued that commercial speech is often as valuable as, and even more valua-
ble than, political speech, and consequently should be given comparable protection. See
Redish, The First Amendment in the Marketplace: Commercial Speech and the Values of
Free Expression, 39 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 429, 432-34, 443-48 (1971).
37 See, e.g., Baker, Commercial Speech: A Problem in the Theory of Freedom, 62 IowA
L. REv. 1, 2-3, 44-49, 53-54 (1976); Baldasty & Simpson, The Deceptive "Right to Know":
How Pessimism Rewrote the First Amendment, 56 WASH. L. REv. 365, 391-92 (1981). Jus-
tice Rehnquist, who has dissented from nearly all of the cases affording protection to com-
mercial speech, see Riggs, The Burger Court and Individual Rights: Commercial Speech as
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mercial speech in the decade following that decision.3 8 The first
amendment has been applied to strike down government restric-
tions placed on contraceptive advertisements,"9 attorney advertise-
ments,40 public utility messages, 41 and the use of "for sale" signs in
a Case Study, 21 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 957, 986 (1981) (table), has been perhaps the strong-
est critic of the Court's holding in Virginia Board. Insisting that the first amendment was
intended primarily to protect speech about "political, social, and other public issues," Jus-
tice Rehnquist's dissent in Virginia Board objected to the majority's inclusion of speech
concerning "the decision of a particular individual as to whether to purchase one or another
kind of shampoo." Virginia Board, 425 U.S. at 787 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehn-
quist has demonstrated a reluctance "to take even one step down the 'slippery slope' away
from" the rule set out in Valentine. See Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 405
(1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). More recently, Justice Rehnquist warned that the present
four-part test for commercial speech restrictions, see infra note 47 and accompanying text,
has "devitalized" the first amendment by raising commercial speech to a level of protection
"virtually indistinguishable from that of noncommercial speech." Central Hudson Gas &
Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 591 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
18 See infra notes 39-44 and accompanying text. But see G. GUNTHER, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1381-82 (10th ed. 1980) (Court recently has become
skeptical about its protection of commercial speech).
31 See, e.g., Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 103 S. Ct. 2875, 2885 (1983); Carey v.
Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 700 (1977). In Carey, a New York statute prohibited
all "advertisement or display" of contraceptives. 431 U.S. at 681 & n.1. The Court held that
the asserted state interests-to shield the public from offensive and embarrassing material
and to avoid legitimizing sexual promiscuity among young people-were not sufficient to
justify suppression of commercial speech. Id. at 701.
The statute in Bolger was a federal law that prohibited the mailing of unsolicited con-
traceptive advertisements. 103 S. Ct. at 2877. The Court again dismissed the contention that
the government could suppress material because of its offensive character, id. at 2883, and
opined that the statute only marginally advanced the second asserted governmental interest
of aiding parents in educating their children about birth control, id. at 2883-84. The govern-
ment may allow addressees to give affirmative notice to the mailer that they wish no further
offensive mailings, but the government may not completely exclude from the mails all mate-
rial that it decides might potentially offend the public. Id. at 2883.
10 See, e.g., Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 384 (1977). Less than 2 years
after the Virginia Board Court left the question open, see 425 U.S. at 773 n.25, attorney
advertising was given first amendment protection for the first time in Bates, see 433 U.S. at
384. As in Virginia Board, the Court in Bates stressed the "indispensable role" performed
by commercial speech: informing the public to facilitate the allocation of resources in a free
market economy. Id. at 364. At issue in Bates was a bar association disciplinary rule forbid-
ding attorney advertisement by any means of commercial publicity. See id. at 355. The
appellants placed an advertisement in a daily newspaper and were suspended from the prac-
tice of law. Id. at 354, 356. Concluding that Virginia Board was controlling, the Court held
the disciplinary rule unconstitutional because it "serve[d] to inhibit the free flow of com-
mercial information and to keep the public in ignorance." Id. at 365.
Within the year following Bates, the Court decided two more attorney advertisement
cases on the same day, invalidating a disciplinary sanction in one, while upholding a sanc-
tion in the other. In In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978), an attorney associated with the
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) was reprimanded for sending a letter to a woman
advising her that free legal assistance was available from the ACLU, see id. at 416-19, 416
n.6. The other case decided that day, Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978),
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the sale of private homes.42 With few exceptions,43 the Court has
evinced a consistent intolerance of state action that, even when
serving a substantial governmental interest, unnecessarily inter-
feres with one's right to communicate freely with potential
customers.44
The current status of commercial speech law was solidified in
Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commis-
involved the disciplinary sanctioning of an attorney who had personally solicited a hospital-
ized automobile accident victim, id. at 449-54. The disciplinary sanction in Ohralik was
upheld, id. at 468, while the sanction in Primus was reversed, 436 U.S. at 439. In distin-
guishing the two cases, the Court determined that the letter of advice at issue in Primus was
significantly less likely to provide opportunity for overreaching or coercion than the in-per-
son solicitation in Ohralik. See Primus, 436 U.S. at 435-36. The Court also distinguished the
motive of advancing beliefs and ideas in Primus from the motive of pecuniary gain in
Ohralik. Id. at 422.
The Court's most recent decision on attorney advertising is In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191
(1982). In R.M.J., the attorney advertisement, placed in newspapers and a local telephone
directory, violated a state rule prohibiting the use of specified words and phrases in at-
tempting to solicit clients. See id. at 196-98, 197 n.8. Invalidating the restrictive rule, the
Court summarized the law of commercial speech concerning attorney advertising:
Truthful advertising related to lawful activities is entitled to the protections of the
First Amendment. But when the particular content or method of the advertising
suggests that it is inherently misleading or when experience has proved that in
fact such advertising is subject to abuse, the States may impose appropriate re-
strictions. . . . [However,] restrictions upon such advertising may be no broader
than reasonably necessary to prevent the deception.
Id. at 203. For a discussion of the implications of R.M.J., and of the current status of attor-
ney advertising, see Whitman & Stoltenberg, The Present Constitutional Status of Lawyer
Advertising-Theoretical and Practical Implications of In re R.M.J., 57 ST. JOHN'S L. REv.
445, 474-82 (1983).
41 See, e.g., Central Hddson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557,
571-72 (1980); Consolidated Edison Co. of New York, Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S.
530, 544 (1980). In Consolidated Edison, a public utility included in its bills inserts discuss-
ing issues of public policy, see 447 U.S. at 532, and thus the commercial speech doctrine was
not controlling, see id. at 533. Central Hudson, on the other hand, has become the most
crucial case in the law of commercial speech. See infra notes 45-48 and accompanying text.
42 See, e.g., Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 98 (1977).
Conceding that the town asserted a "vital" interest in maintaining a stable, racially inte-
grated community, id. at 94, the Court nevertheless invalidated an ordinance restricting the
use of "for sale" signs because it did not directly advance that interest and it restricted the
right of the community to receive a free flow of housing information, id. at 95-96. The ma-
jority reasoned that, to protect the community from the evils of "panic selling," the remedy
should be "more speech, not enforced silence." Id. at 97 (quoting Whitney v. California, 274
U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring)).
4' See, e.g., Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1979) (statute prohibiting practice of
optometry under a trade name upheld because trade names may easily be used to deceive
and mislead); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 464-65 (1978) (disciplinary
sanction imposed against attorney for "ambulance chasing" upheld because such in-person
solicitation creates substantial risk of overreaching).
" See supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text.
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sion.4 5 In Central Hudson, the Court invalidated a regulation that
prohibited an electric utility from advertising to promote the con-
sumption of electricity.46 A four-part analysis was developed to de-
termine the constitutionality of commercial speech restrictions:
For commercial speech to come within [first amendment protec-
tion], it at least must concern lawful activity and not be mislead-
ing. Next, we ask whether the asserted governmental interest is
substantial. If both inquiries yield positive answers, we must de-
termine whether the regulation directly advances the governmen-
tal interest asserted, and whether it is not more extensive than is
necessary to serve that interest.4"
Thus, if speech regulated by the SEC is within the class of
commercial speech, the Central Hudson test will determine the
constitutional validity of the regulatory scheme.48 However, as will
be suggested in the following analysis of cases arising under the
Investment Advisers Act of 1940, courts should be cautious not to
conclude prematurely that all publications about securities are
necessarily commercial speech.
FIRST AMENDMENT CHALLENGES TO THE INVESTMENT ADVISERS ACT
Designed to prevent deception, manipulation, and other po-
tential misconduct by those who furnish paid advice about securi-
ties investments, 49 the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (Invest-
45 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
" See id. at 558, 571-72. The regulation in Central Hudon originally was passed in
1973 as a response to the fuel shortage, but was continued after the shortage to help pro-
mote the national policy of conserving energy. See id. at 559. "Informational" advertis-
ing-that which merely encouraged ratepayers to shift their consumption to off-peak
hours-was permitted by the regulation. See id. at 560.
"I Id. at 566. Applying the four-part test, the Central Hudson Court found both of the
asserted state interests-conservation of energy and maintenance of fair and efficient
rates-to be "substantial." Id. at 568-69. The Court further found that the regulation di-
rectly advanced the state interest in conservation. Id. at 569. However, the ban on promo-
tional advertising failed to meet the fourth requirement of the test: it was not proven to be
the least restrictive means by which the interest could have been achieved. See id. at 569-71.
Thus, it was more extensive than necessary, and consequently was held invalid. See id. at
571-72.
" See infra notes 142-54 and accompanying text.
" See S. REP. No. 1775, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 21 (1940); H.R. REP. No. 2639, 76th Cong.,
3d Sess. 28 (1940). See generally SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180,
186-92 (1963) (Investment Advisers Act designed to eliminate certain abuses in the securi-
ties industry); Abrahamson v. Fleschner, 568 F.2d 862, 870-73 (2d Cir. 1977) (Act illustrates
that the problems and abuses of investment advisory services must be controlled through
federal legislation), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 905 (1978).
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ment Advisers Act or Act)50 prohibits an investment adviser from
using the mails or interstate commerce before registering with the
SEC.5 The term "investment adviser" includes anyone who, for
compensation, either advises others about buying and selling se-
curities, or as part of a regular business analyzes or reports about
securities.5 2 The statute excludes from its coverage, however, "the
publisher of any bona fide newspaper, news magazine or business
or financial publication of general and regular circulation. ' 53 The
SEC may enforce the Act by, inter alia, denying or revoking an
adviser's registration, 4 and obtaining injunctive relief against the
publication of advice by unregistered advisers.5 Recently, litiga-
tion has arisen in which defendants have argued unsuccessfully
that to allow the SEC to enjoin the publication of impersonal in-
vestment periodicals would constitute prior restraint in violation of
the first amendment.56
SEC v. Lowe
In SEC v. Lowe,57 the defendant Lowe published subscription
newsletters containing general observations and comments about
the securities and bullion markets, and impersonal advice about
the buying and selling of specific stocks and bullion. After Lowe
was convicted of criminal misconduct as an investment adviser, the
6O Ch. 686, tit. 2, 54 Stat. 847 (1940) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to 80b-
21 (1982)).
51 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(a) (1982).
52 Id. § 80b-2(a)(11).
I3 d.
Id. § 80b-3(e).
Id. § 80b-9(e).
' See SEC v. Suter, 732 F.2d 1294, 1299-1300 (7th Cir. 1984); SEC v. Lowe, 725 F.2d
892, 901-02 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 105 S. Ct. 81 (1984) (No. 83-1911); SEC v. Wall St.
Publishing Institute, Inc., 591 F. Supp. 1070, 1080-81 (D.D.C. 1984), motion for stay pend-
ing appeal granted, [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 91,635, at 99,219-20 (D.C. Cir.
Aug. 10, 1984). In the past 3 years, the SEC has commenced seven civil cases, twelve admin-
istrative proceedings, and five investigations against publishers of investment newsletters.
Ingersoll, Regulating Advice: Financial Newsletters Face Growing Pressure to Register
with SEC, Wall St. J., Nov. 15, 1984, at 1, col. 6, 20, col.1.
.7 725 F.2d 892 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 105 S. Ct. 81 (1984) (No. 83-1911).
11 See SEC v. Lowe, 556 F. Supp. 1359, 1361 (E.D.N.Y. 1983), rev'd, 725 F.2d 892 (2d
Cir.), cert. granted, 105 S. Ct. 81 (1984) (No. 83-1911). Lowe published three services: the
Lowe Investment Letter, the Lowe Stock Advisory, and the Lowe Stock Chart Service. Id.
The former two were published only at irregular intervals, and the third had not yet been
published. Id. Lowe also offered a telephone hotline with the most current information. Id.
Both the district court and the Second Circuit held this hotline unprotected by the first
amendment. See 556 F. Supp. at 1371; 725 F.2d at 902.
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SEC, pursuant to the Investment Advisers Act, revoked his regis-
tration.5 9 Lowe nevertheless continued to publish his newsletters,
and the Commission brought an action in federal district court to
enjoin further publication. 0 In one of the first decisions in which a
court has applied the first amendment to restrict the SEC's ability
to enforce the securities regulations, Chief Judge Weinstein of the
Eastern District of New York denied the injunctive relief.61 Chief
Judge Weinstein observed that "the combination of fact, economic
and political analyses, conjecture, and recommendation" that is
characteristic of newsletters published by "detached observer[s]"
such as Lowe probably renders such communication outside the
category of commercial speech.2 The case was decided, however,
under the more lenient scrutiny of a commercial speech analysis.6 3
Chief Judge Weinstein held that an impermissible prior restraint
would result if the Investment Advisers Act authorized the SEC to
deny, by means of a license revocation based on past misconduct,
Lowe's right to publish impersonal investment advice. 4 Instead of
declaring the Act unconstitutional, however, Chief Judge Wein-
stein narrowly construed the Act to avoid its constitutional infir-
mity.6 5 The opinion distinguished between personal and imper-
sonal advice, holding that only the former may constitutionally be
" In re Lowe Management Corp., [1981 Transfer Binder] FED SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 1
82,873, at 84,324 (May 11, 1981). Lowe's criminal misconduct included misappropriation of
client funds, failure to register under New York law, grand larceny, and tampering with
evidence. See id.
60 Lowe, 556 F. Supp. at 1362.
11 Id. at 1371. Experts believe the decision of the district court was the first to accept
the argument that SEC injunctions may violate the free speech guarantee. See, e.g., Fried,
supra note 3, at D19, col. 3 (quoting former SEC commissioner Richard Smith); Goodale,
supra note 3, at 4, col. 1. But see SEC v. Wall St. Transcript Corp., 294 F. Supp. 298, 304,
307 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (denying enforcement of SEC subpoena against weekly securities tab-
loid), rev'd, 422 F.2d 1371 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 958 (1970).
2 Lowe, 556 F. Supp. at 1366-67. Observing that economic discussion is often intermin-
gled with political discussion, and even more important to the public, id. at 1367, Chief
Judge Weinstein determined that the Lowe newsletters more closely resembled public issue
speech than product advertising, id. at 1366-67.
"' See id. at 1365-66. Chief Judge Weinstein applied the four-part test of Central Hud-
son Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980); see supra notes 45-
47 and accompanying text, and determined that the Investment Advisers Act failed to meet
the fourth requirement of the test; namely, it was more extensive than necessary to achieve
what was conceded to be a substantial governmental interest, Lowe, 556 F. Supp. at 1366.
The court found that less restrictive alternative means were available, such as requiring
disclosure about Lowe's past convictions. Id.
61 Lowe, 556 F. Supp. at 1361, 1371.
" Id. at 1368-69.
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subjected to the prior restraint of the Investment Advisers Act.6
The district court decision was reversed by a divided Second
Circuit.6 7 The circuit court, rejecting the view that commercial
speech includes only advertising, had little difficulty dismissing the
contention that investment newsletters are entitled to full first
amendment protection .6  The majority relied upon pre-Virginia
Board precedent to sustain the facial validity of the Investment
Advisers Act,69 and drew an analogy between SEC registration and
the licensing of professionals to dismiss the argument that revoca-
tion of registration on the basis of past misconduct is impermissi-
ble.7 0 Such revocation, reasoned the court, is a legitimate regula-
"' Id. at 1369, 1371. The distinction between personal and impersonal advice presuma-
bly rests upon the assumption that the latter is inherently more susceptible to abuse. Cf.
Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 455, 457 (1978) (distinguishing in-person
solicitation from public advertisement by attorney). Chief Judge Weinstein also held that
Lowe was not required under current securities laws or regulations to disclose to his sub-
scribers any information concerning his past misconduct or his registration revocation. 556
F. Supp. at 1370.
17 SEC v. Lowe, 725 F.2d. 892, 902 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. granted, 105 S. Ct. 81 (1984)
(No. 83-1911). Judge Oakes wrote the opinion of the court in which Judge Van Graafeiland
concurred in a separate opinion. District Judge Brieant, sitting by designation, dissented.
11 See id. at 900-01. The Second Circuit suggested that free speech was not an issue at
all; the case involved merely "the permissible regulation of economic activity." Id. at 901
(emphasis added).
11 See id. at 398-900. The precedent cited as controlling was SEC v. Wall St. Transcript
Corp., 422 F.2d 1371 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 958 (1970), wherein the Second Circuit
held that enforcement of a subpoena that required the production of materials by a weekly
securities information tabloid did not offend the first amendment, see 422 F.2d at 1381. In
Wall St. Transcript, the court held that the Investment Advisers Act need not exclude "all
publications which could conceivably be brought within the term 'typical newspaper,'" id.
at 1378, and that it "does not on its face abridge freedom of the press simply because it may
be applied to publications which are classified formally as part of the 'press,'" id. at 1379.
In Lowe, the Second Circuit was well aware that Wall St. Transcript was decided before
commercial speech was given any first amendment protection, but nonetheless determined
that it "still states good law." 725 F.2d at 899. This determination, it is submitted, was
erroneous; the holding in Wall St. Transcript was premised on case law emphasizing that
commercial speech is wholly unprotected by the first amendment, see Wall St. Transcript,
422 F.2d at 1379. See Lowe, 725 F.2d at 904 (Brieant, J., dissenting) (Wall St. Transcript is
now "as dead as Marley").
70 Lowe, 725 F.2d at 901. "Saying that appellees may not sell their views as to the
purchase, sale, or holding of certain securities is no different from saying that a disbarred
lawyer may not sell legal advice." Id. at 902. This analogy, it is submitted, is inapposite. The
more appropriate analogy is whether a bar association may prohibit a disbarred attorney
from publishing impersonal newsletters about citizens' legal rights, including opinions about
the value of legal services performed by specific law firms and practitioners, or whether non-
attorneys may be prohibited from publishing law-related articles. Cf. id. at 903 (Brieant, J.,
dissenting) (distinguishing health care periodical and book advising how to avoid probate
from the practices of medicine and law).
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
tion of business activity, and is not rendered any less legitimate
merely because the activity involves speech.71
In dissent, Judge Brieant agreed with Chief Judge Weinstein
that the newsletters were outside the rubric of commercial speech
and, therefore, entitled to full first amendment protection against
prior restraint.72 Judge Brieant reasoned that the sale of Lowe's
"editorial expression of. . .facts and opinions" was no more com-
mercial speech than the sale of "our most respected daily newspa-
per. '73 Consequently, the dissent maintained, the case should have
been treated as a pure first amendment speech case, with the
traditional heavy burden against the constitutional validity of any
prior restraint.7 4 Judge Brieant viewed the statute as both overin-
clusive and underinclusive in its coverage, 75 and objected to the
injunction sought because it was "'more extreme than necessary'"
and would be illusory and impractical to enforce. 6
Subsequent Developments: SEC v. Suter and SEC v. Wall Street
Publishing Institute, Inc.
Four months after the Second Circuit decided the Lowe case,
the Seventh Circuit reached a similar result in SEC v. Suter.77 In
Suter, the district court granted the SEC injunctive relief against
the publication of false and misleading promotional advertise-
ments of an investment adviser's newsletter.78 The injunction pre-
" Id. at 899, 901. To rely only on subsequent punishment, according to the majority,
would be inadequate for the protection of the public. Id. at 901-02.
72 Id. at 904 (Brieant, J., dissenting). Judge Brieant was convinced "that the concept of
commercial speech [is] now . . . confined to naked advertising and closely related methods
of commercial solicitation." Id. (Brieant, J. dissenting). The dissent argued that investment
opinion should be protected from prior restraint just in the same manner as "political opin-
ion, philosophy or gibberish." Id. at 907 (Brieant, J., dissenting).
" Id. at 904 (Brieant, J., dissenting).
71 Id. at 907 (Brieant, J., dissenting) (citing Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S.
58, 70 (1963)); see supra note 13.
7 725 F.2d at 908 (Brieant, J., dissenting). According to Judge Brieant, the majority's
construction of the statute was overinclusive in that it permitted the licensing of newsletters
that should be given the protection of bona fide newspapers, and underinclusive because
Lowe would have been fully protected if he had published the same information in someone
else's bona fide newspaper. Id. (Brieant, J., dissenting).
" Id. at 910 & n.4 (Brieant, J., dissenting) (quoting SEC v. Lowe, 556 F. Supp. at
1366).
7 732 F.2d 1294 (7th Cir. 1984).
78 Id. at 1298. The advertisements at issue contained misrepresentations about what
purportedly "satisfied" subscribers had said about Suter, exaggerated Suter's market experi-
ence, and falsified Suter's educational qualifications. Id. at 1297.
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vented not only the publication of the advertisements, but also the
publication of any investment advice, unless defendant Suter al-
lowed the Commission to inspect his records and provided the
Commission with copies of all future publications.79 Rejecting a
first amendment argument by Suter, the Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit upheld the injunction.80 The court based its deci-
sion solely on commercial speech law and did not even address the
possibility that the case involved pure first amendment speech."'
Applying the test set forth in Central Hudson,82 the Suter court
held that Suter's speech was unprotected because it was mislead-
ing.83 The court further indicated that the injunction was no
broader than necessary to prevent Suter's deception.84 Thus, with-
out fully considering the implications of enjoining Suter's newslet-
ters along with his advertisements, the Seventh Circuit found no
unlawful prior restraint in the SEC injunction. 85
Most recently, in SEC v. Wall Street Publishing Institute,
Inc.,86 the Commission obtained an injunction against the pub-
lisher of Stock Market Magazine, a monthly magazine devoted to
helping investors "make intelligent investment decisions. ' ' 87 The
Commission alleged that the publisher was operating as an unre-
gistered investment adviser and was involved in various fraudulent
and misleading practices," including the publication of ostensibly
objective articles that were, in fact, written by press agents of the
subject companies.89 Although the district court did not directly
79 Id. at 1298. In addition to restrictions placed upon Suter's future publication, the
injunction prohibited Suter from employing fraud or deceit in his business, and from offer-
ing for sale or selling unregistered securities. Id. The injunction also mandated that Suter
provide the SEC with a detailed accounting of all funds received by him or his business in
connection with securities trading. Id.
80 Id. at 1299-1300, 1302.
81 See id. at 1299.
82 Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566; see supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text.
83 Suter, 732 F.2d at 1299. The court determined that Suter's advertisements "bla-
tantly lie[d] about his experience, education and qualification," and "unashamedly carr[ied]
a worthless money-back guarantee." Id.
84 Id. at 1299-1300.
85 Id. at 1300, 1302.
81 591 F. Supp. 1070 (D.D.C. 1984), motion for stay pending appeal granted, [Current]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 91,635, at 99,219-20 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 10, 1984).
87 591 F. Supp. at 1076.
88 Id. at 1074.
88 Id. at 1076. It was admitted by the defendant publisher that in exchange for printing
articles written by and favorable to subject companies, the companies, as a quid pro quo,
would purchase advertising space in the magazine. See id.
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address a first amendment challenge, the opinion cited the Lowe
decision for the broad proposition that the Investment Advisers
Act has survived constitutional scrutiny.90 Thus, the court focused
its attention on whether the defendant was entitled to the statu-
tory exemption available to "the publisher of any bona fide news-
paper, news magazine or financial publication of general and regu-
lar circulation." 9' Holding that the publisher of Stock Market
Magazine was not entitled to the exemption, and side-stepping the
first amendment issue, the court enjoined future publication of the
magazine until the publisher registered with the SEC and abided
by the Commission's rules for investment advisers.92 However, the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, citing "the
magnitude of the First Amendment interests at stake," has sus-
pended the injunction pending appeal.9 3
Determining the Proper Level of Protection for Investment
Advice
It is submitted that the courts in Lowe, Suter, and Wall
Street Publishing have underestimated the expansiveness of the
Supreme Court's current interpretation of the first amendment. In
denying full first amendment protection to impersonal investment
advice, the courts have expanded the scope of the commercial
speech class to include a medium of communication far removed
from any other that the Supreme Court has thus far included. 4
Concededly, the Supreme Court has not yet had an occasion to set
forth an authoritative definition of the term "commercial
speech."9 5 To date, however, all the commercial speech cases de-
90 See id. at 1080.
9' Investment Advisers Act of 1940 § 202(a)(11)(D), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11) (1982); see
Wall St. Publishing, [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 91,575, at 98,934-36.
92 Wall St. Publishing, 591 F. Supp. at 1079-81.
" [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) T 91,635, at 99,219-20.
"' Thus far, the Supreme Court has afforded less than full protection only to commer-
cial speech that "has been inextricably intertwined with advertising." Lowe, 725 F.2d at 905
(Brieant, J., dissenting); see supra notes 32-47 and accompanying text; infra notes 97-99
and accompanying text.
"' See Alderman, Commercial Entities' Noncommercial Speech: A Contradiction in
Terms, 1982 UTAH L. REV. 731, 741. The Court has characterized commercial speech as that
which does "no more than propose a commercial transaction," Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods.
Corp., 463 U.S. 60, -, 103 S. Ct. 2875, 2880 (1983) (quoting Pittsburgh Press Co. v.
Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 385 (1973)), and as "expression re-
lated solely to the economic interests of the speaker and its audience," Central Hudson Gas
& Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 561 (1980).
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cided by the Supreme Court have involved pure commercial
advertising.96
At least three Justices presently on the Supreme Court have
expressed a reluctance to expand the category of commercial
speech beyond advertising.97 This view has been adopted by at
least two federal courts, which have inferred that the Supreme
Court intended to limit the class of commercial speech exclusively
to advertisements. 8 Several commentators likewise have discussed
the commercial speech cases under the assumption that commer-
cial speech is coterminous with advertising.9 9 Other commentators,
however, advocate a much broader scope for the concept of com-
mercial speech.100 One suggested interpretation would include "any
speech by a commercial entity,"''1 a definition that has been re-
'6 See, e.g., Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S.
376, 385 (1973). The Pittsburgh Press Court characterized the advertisements at issue in
that case as "classic examples of commercial speech." Id.
7 See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 573 (Blackmun, J., concurring); id. at 579-80 (Ste-
vens, J., concurring). Justice Brennan joined in both of these concurring opinions. Justice
Stevens warned that "[b]ecause 'commercial speech' is afforded less constitutional protec-
tion . . . , it is important that the commercial speech concept not be defined too broadly
lest speech deserving of greater constitutional protection be inadvertently suppressed." Id.
at 579 (Stevens, J., concurring). In addition to Justices Stevens, Blackmun, and Brennan,
Justice Rehnquist has made clear his disapproval of the entire idea of protection for com-
mercial speech. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
0' See Ad World, Inc. v. Township of Doylestown, 672 F.2d 1136, 1140 (3d Cir.) (com-
munity newspaper devoted almost exclusively to advertising given full first amendment pro-
tection), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 975 (1982); SEC v. Lowe, 556 F. Supp. 1359, 1366-67
(E.D.N.Y. 1983) (investment newsletter is probably outside the rubric of commercial speech,
and therefore deserving of full first amendment protection), rev'd, 725 F.2d 892 (2d Cir.),
cert. granted, 105 S. Ct. 81 (No. 83-1911) (1984); see also Lowe, 725 F.2d at 904 (Brieant, J.,
dissenting) (commercial speech limited to "naked advertising" and solicitation).
" See, e.g., J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 1, at 923 (describing com-
mercial speech as "speech of any form that advertises a product or service for profit or for
business purposes"); Barrett, "The Unchartered Area"-Commercial Speech and the First
Amendment, 13 U.C.D. L. REV. 175, 205 (1980) (line distinguishing pure speech from com-
mercial speech should be between general public interest advertising and advertisement for
particular goods); Farber, Commercial Speech and First Amendment Theory, 74 Nw. U.L.
REv. 372, 381, 386 (1979) (subject matter of commercial speech is product or service, and
speaker is the seller).
100 See, e.g., Alderman, supra note 95, at 731, 744 (all speech by commercial entity
should be classified as commercial speech); Comment, First Amendment Protection for
Commercial Advertising: The New Constitutional Doctrine, 44 U. CHI. L. REv. 205, 234
(1976) (favoring an overinclusive definition of commercial speech).
' Alderman, supra note 95, at 744. Alderman suggests that a "broad, inclusive defini-
tion" of commercial speech would "simplify the process." Id. Thus, "any and all speech of a
commercial entity" should be the definition, id. at 732, with "commercial entity" likewise
broadly defined to include any business whose existence is based on profit, see id. at 744 &
n.51.
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jected by the Supreme Court.102 Before commercial speech received
even limited protection, Justice Douglas referred to the unpro-
tected class as "speech directed at private economic decisionmak-
ing,"'10 which clearly includes more than advertisement. In Lowe,
the Second Circuit expressed a view consistent with that of Justice
Douglas when it rejected the proposition that commercial speech is
limited to advertising. 10 4
It is suggested that commercial speech should not include
third-party commentary by people who, though selling their ad-
vice, have no economic interest in the outcome of the particular
transactions about which they report. Although the Supreme Court
may have intended to include within the class of commercial
speech more than pure commercial advertising, it is suggested that
the Court did not intend to include all speech by commercial enti-
ties, or all speech concerning private economic decisionmaking.
The underlying rationale of limited protection for commercial
speech suggests that the concept was intended to be narrower.
105
The investment adviser's desire for profit cannot be controlling, for
profit is also the primary motive of many book authors, newspaper
publishers, and even political pamphleteers. 10 6 Similarly, speech is
not deemed "commercial" merely because the speaker is a com-
mercial entity,10 7 or because the speech relates to commercial mat-
ters.108 At the very least, it is suggested, "commercial speech"
102 See First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 784 (1978). Bellotti in-
volved a challenge to a Massachusetts statute that prohibited specific business corporations
from making expenditures or contributions to influence popular voting unless the subject
matter of the vote materially affected the corporation. Id. at 767-70. The appellant corpora-
tions wished to spend money to influence voting on a referendum issue that did not materi-
ally affect them. See id. at 769. The speech proffered by the corporation, the Court held,
was "at the heart of the First Amendment's protection." Id. at 776. The Court continued:
"The inherent worth of the speech in terms of its capacity for informing the public does not
depend upon the identity of its source, whether corporation, association, union, or individ-
ual." Id. at 777.
103 Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Grove, 404 U.S. 898, 905 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
104 See Lowe, 725 F.2d at 900-01 (holding that investment advice newsletters are within
the scope of commercial speech).
105 See Ad World, Inc. v. Township of Doylestown, 672 F.2d 1136, 1140 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 456 U.S. 975 (1982); SEC v. Lowe, 556 F. Supp. 1359, 1366-67 (E.D.N.Y. 1983),
rev'd, 725 F.2d 892 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. granted, 105 S. Ct. 81 (1984) (No. 83-1911).
106 See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
107 See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
10' See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. at 748, 761 (1976). If speech were deemed commercial merely because it concerned
commercial matters, publications like Forbes and The Wall St. Journal would be given less
than full first amendment protection. Such a result, it is submitted, would make a mockery
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should not include opinions about transactions to which the
speaker is not a potential party. Thus, it is submitted, since com-
mercial speech is given less protection because of the speaker's ex-
tensive knowledge and economic self-interest,10 9 a useful definition
would include all speech that proposes a commercial transaction
and is made by a potential party to that particular transaction. 10
Such a definition would permit regulation of speech that goes be-
yond pure advertisement, but would protect third-party commen-
tators who lack economic self-interest in consummating particular
transactions."'
If subscription newsletters and investment advice periodicals
are to be accorded full first amendment protection, it is suggested
that the Investment Advisers Act is facially invalid. Courts have
shown less tolerance of licensing schemes similar to SEC registra-
tion requirements than of any other method of speech restric-
tion." 2 The Supreme Court has admonished that it "strikes at the
very heart" of the first amendment to require a license from the
government as a condition of exercising freedom of speech or
press, 1 3 particularly when, as with the SEC, the discretion of the
of freedom of speech.
'" Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564 n.6; see also Virginia Board, 425 U.S. at 771-72
n.24 (commercial speech is verifiable by the disseminator).
110 See Baker, supra note 37, at 35. Although Baker argues that commercial speech
deserves no protection, see id. at 3, he nevertheless limits the category of commercial speech
to that which "is directed towards influencing private commercial transactions and is made
by a potential party to such transactions," id. at 35 (emphasis added). Another commenta-
tor has intimated that if the author of a communication is not the seller of the product or
service involved, the communication should be eligible for full first amendment protection.
See Rotunda, The Commercial Speech Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 1976 U. ILL. L.F.
1080, 1090; see also Farber, supra note 99, at 386 (one difference between commercial
speech and pure speech is that the former is spoken by the seller).
"' See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564 n.6; Virginia Board, 425 U.S. at 771-72 n.24.
Of course, if a third-party commentator has an economic interest in the transactions about
which he reports, any false or misleading statements or omissions, for example "scalping,
would be actionable under § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j
(1982), and rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1984). See, e.g.,
Zweig v. Hearst Corp., 594 F.2d 1261, 1266 (9th Cir. 1979).
"I See supra note 14. Soon after the securities acts were passed, the Supreme Court
acknowledged that the SEC is a licensing authority: "[T]he filing of the registration state-
ment is in effect an ex parte application for a license to use the mails and the facilities of
interstate commerce for the purposes recognized by the act." Jones v. SEC, 298 U.S. 1, 22
(1936).
11' Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 164 (1939); see supra note 14. In Schneider, the
Court invalidated a licensing scheme because it rendered "liberty to communicate . . . de-
pend[ent] upon the exercise of the officer's discretion." 308 U.S. at 164. The Court
continued:
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licensing agency in determining who is fit to publish is limited only
by a vague "in the public interest" standard.1 14 Moreover, courts
rarely accept the prevention of anticipated wrongdoing as a justifi-
cation for enjoining speech,1 5 especially when the prediction is
based upon speculative assessments of the speaker's past miscon-
duct." ' The SEC unquestionably has a compelling interest in
To require a censorship through license which makes impossible the free and un-
hampered distribution of pamphlets strikes at the very heart of the constitutional
guarantees.
Conceding that fraudulent appeals may be made..., we hold a municipal-
ity cannot, for this reason, require all who wish to disseminate ideas to present
them first to police authorities for their consideration and approval, with a discre-
tion in the police to say some ideas may, while others may not, be carried to the
homes of citizens; some persons may, while others may not, disseminate informa-
tion from house to house. Frauds may be denounced as offenses and punished by
law. . . . If it is said that these means are less efficient and convenient . . . , the
answer is that considerations of this sort do not empower a municipality to
abridge freedom of speech and press.
Id. (emphasis added). Thus, freedom of speech cannot be conditioned upon obtaining a li-
cense, even if the government asserts the interest of preventing fraud. See id. Even assum-
ing impersonal investment newsletters are pure commercial speech-no different from ad-
vertisement-the Supreme Court has upheld bans on such speech only when they are
inherently misleading or susceptible to fraud and overreaching. See Friedman v. Rogers, 440
U.S. 1, 12-13 (1979) (use of trade names in the practice of optometry); Ohralik v. Ohio State
Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 464-65 (1978) ("ambulance chasing" by attorney); see also In re
R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 203 (1982) (misleading professional advertising may be regulated).
14 See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(e), (f), (h) (1982). "In the public interest" provisions are
found in subsections 203(e), (f) and (h) of the Investment Advisers Act. See id. Such a
standard, it is submitted, is not sufficiently narrow to withstand first amendment scrutiny.
Cf. Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 149-51 (1969) (city commission
guided by statutory standard of "the public welfare, peace, safety, health, decency, good
order, morals or convenience"); Staub v. Baxley, 355 U.S. 313, 322 (1958) (in decisions on
permits, mayor and city council shall consider "effects upon the general welfare of citi-
zens"). As the Shuttlesworth Court held, such a standard falls "squarely within the ambit of
the many decisions of this Court . . . holding that a law subjecting the exercise of First
Amendment freedoms to the prior restraint of a license, without narrow, objective, and defi-
nite standards to guide the licensing authority, is unconstitutional." 394 U.S. at 150-51.
"' See Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 543 (1980) (in-
validating commission order prohibiting inclusion of public issue inserts in monthly utility
bills).
116 See, e.g., Vance v. Universal Amusement Co., 445 U.S. 308, 315-16 (1980) (per
curiam) (extremely heavy burden on prior restraint of obscenity when it is based upon past
communication); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 711 (1931) (all nine prior editions of
newspaper contained malicious, scandalous, and defamatory material in violation of stat-
ute); Entertainment Concepts, Inc. v. Maciejewski, 631 F.2d 497, 506 (7th Cir. 1980) (use of
prior restraint based upon past conduct is precisely what was condemned in Near), cert.
denied, 450 U.S. 919 (1981). As stated succinctly by Judge Goettel of the Southern District
of New York:
A regulatory scheme under which a license necessary to the exercise of First
Amendment rights may be denied or revoked because of a past conviction . . .
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preventing fraud in the securities markets; however, similar com-
pelling interests in other contexts have not justified the use of
prior restraint.1 17 It is therefore suggested that, if it is to be inter-
preted consistently, the first amendment should limit the Commis-
sion, as it does other agencies, to subsequent punishment of unlaw-
ful speech.
FIRST AMENDMENT ISSUES RAISED BY THE 1933 AND 1934 ACTS
Background Issues
The issues presented in Lowe, Suter, and Wall Street Pub-
lishing invite inquiry into the possibility of first amendment
problems with SEC regulation of public offerings under the Securi-
ties Act of 1933 (1933 Act)1 s and of securities trading under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 Act).11 9
Section 5 of the 1933 Act prohibits the use of the mails or
interstate commerce for the purpose of selling or offering to sell
securities unless the issuer is registered with the SEC. 2 ° As does
constitutes a system of prior restraint. [It is] impermissible to deny a person the
right to exercise a fundamental freedom (by denying a license . . .) solely upon
the ground that that person has suffered a prior criminal conviction...
The City may not ... utilize its licensing power to deprive a party of the right to
exercise a constitutionally protected right solely because of past misconduct.
Natco Theatres, Inc. v. Ratner, 463 F. Supp. 1124, 1129-30 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). In Natco, the
statute allowed revocation or denial of a license only for crimes directly related to the li-
cense sought. Id. at 1130-31. By contrast, the Investment Advisers Act sweeps much more
broadly, allowing prior restraint based upon past misconduct outside one's business as an
investment adviser, and even outside one's activity in any securities-related endeavor. See
15 U.S.C. § 60b-3(e)(2) (1982).
11 See, e.g., Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 562-63 (1976) (compelling
interest in ensuring a fair trial for criminal defendant); New York Times Co. v. United
States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (per curiam) (compelling interest in national security); see
infra note 154 and accompanying text.
"1 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1982).
'19 Id. §§ 78a-78kk.
120 Id. § 77e. Section 5(c) of the 1933 Act provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, to make use of any
means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce
or of the mails to offer to sell or offer to buy through the use or medium of any
prospectus or otherwise any security, unless a registration statement has been
filed as to such security, or while the registration statement is the subject of a
refusal order or stop order . ...
Id. § 77e(c). The concept of "offer to sell" is defined broadly to include, with exceptions,
"every attempt or offer to dispose of, or solicitation of an offer to buy, a security or interest
in a security." Id. § 77b(3). This definition "goes well beyond the common law concept of an
offer." 1 L. Loss, SECURITIEs REGULATION 181 (2d ed. 1961) (citing Carl M. Loeb, Rhoades &
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59:57
the Investment Advisers Act, the 1933 Act provides for injunctive
relief and criminal sanctions to assist the Commission in prevent-
ing unregistered public offers, sales, or advertisements of securi-
ties.121 Thus, under the 1933 Act, an issuer's right to promote a
public offering of securities is conditioned upon the issuer's success
in obtaining an "effective" license from the Commission. 122 The
1934 Act contains similar registration requirements for transac-
tions involving the trading of securities. 23
Unlike the Investment Advisers Act, the 1933 and 1934 Acts
authorize the Commission not only to deny and revoke registra-
tions, but also to censor documents before they are made public.'24
The 1933 Act, for example, requires as part of the registration pro-
cess the filing with the Commission of a copy of the issuer's pro-
spectus, the primary means by which the issuer solicits public
purchases of his securities. 2 5 The Commission may prevent a re-
gistration from becoming effective until the Commission is satis-
fied with the content of the prospectus. 2 6 Through the use of
Co., Securities Exchange Act Release No. 5870, at 8 (1959)). See generally Publication of
Information Prior to or After the Effective Date of a Registration Statement, Securities Act
Release No. 3844 (Oct. 8, 1957) (outlining a number of examples to illustrate the Commis-
sion's view that the statute includes any publicity pertaining to the sale of a security that
"may in fact contribute to conditioning the public mind or arousing public interest in the
issuer"). The word "prospectus" similarly has a very broad definition. See infra note 125.
Thus, the Commission has statutory authority to license the dissemination of an extraordi-
narily broad range of communications.
121 See 15 U.S.C. § 77t(b) (1982).
122 See id. §§ 77g-77h. Sections 7 and 8 of the 1933 Act provide methods by which the
Commission may give notification that an issuer's registration statement is deficient, and
deny effectiveness of the statement until the deficiencies are cured. See id. The Supreme
Court has acknowledged that the registration process is a licensing scheme. See Jones v.
SEC, 298 U.S. 1, 22 (1936).
123 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 781, 78o (1982). Under the 1934 Act, a registration may be
suspended, revoked, or denied by the Commission, see id. § 781(j), and violators of the 1934
Act are subject to injunction and criminal sanction, see id. §§ 78u(d), 78ff.
124 See infra notes 125-35 and accompanying text.
125 D. RATNER, SECURITIES REGULATION 37 (1980); see 15 U.S.C. § 77b(10) (1982). Sec-
tion 2 of the 1933 Act defines "prospectus" broadly as "any prospectus, notice, circular,
advertisement, letter, or communication, written or by radio or television, which offers any
security for sale or confirms the sale of any security." 15 U.S.C. § 77b(10) (1982). It "is no
more than an advertisement for the sale of securities." Goodale, supra note 3, at 4, col. 1. As
such, it is substantially similar to the commercial speech involved in cases considered by the
Supreme Court. See supra notes 32-47 and accompanying text.
126 See, e.g., Goodale, supra note 3, at 1, col. 1; Schneider & Manko, Going Pub-
lic-Practice, Procedure and Consequences, 15 VILL. L. REv. 283, 293-94 (1970) (Commis-
sion gets the "last word").
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"stop orders,"'12 7 "deficiency letters,"'128 and other means of induce-
ment and chilling, 29 the SEC is able to ensure that all documents
concerning public offers conform to the content standards of the
Commission.' 3" Section 14 of the 1934 Act,' and the SEC rules
121 See 15 U.S.C. § 77h(d) (1982). Section 8(d) of the 1933 Act provides, in pertinent
part:
If it appears to the Commission at any time that the registration statement
includes any untrue statement of a material fact or omits to state any material
fact required to be stated therein or necessary to make the statements therein not
misleading, the Commission may. . . issue a stop order suspending the effective-
ness of the registration statement. When such statement has been amended in
accordance with such stop order, the Commission shall so declare and thereupon
the stop order shall cease to be effective.
Id. See generally Oklahoma-Texas Trust v. SEC, 100 F.2d 888, 891-93, 896 (10th Cir. 1939)
(affirming SEC use of stop order against materially deficient registration statement of min-
eral leasing trust). Similarly, section 8(b) of the 1933 Act provides, in pertinent part:
If it appears to the Commission that a registration statement is on its face incom-
plete or inaccurate in any material respect, the Commission may . . . issue an
order prior to the effective date of registration refusing to permit such statement
to become effective until it has been amended in accordance with such order.
15 U.S.C. § 77h(b) (1982). Commission procedure, moreover, places the burden of proof on
the registrant to show cause why a stop order should not be issued. See Jones v. SEC, 298
U.S. 1, 18 (1936). The registrant acts "at his peril" until he has sustained this burden. Id.
128 See Schneider & Manko, supra note 126, at 293-94 (SEC nearly always finds defi-
ciencies, and usually gets the last word).
129 See Karmel, supra note 3, at 2, col. 5. One obvious chilling effect is the time factor;
if an issuer wishes to avoid all delay in the offering of securities, presumably including the
desire to have his registration effectiveness "accelerated" pursuant to section 8(a) of the
1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77h(a) (1982), the issuer will choose to stay clear of any possible
deficiencies, in effect self-censoring its documents. See Schneider & Manko, supra note 126,
at 293. Two commentators on the process note that the fear of civil liability in itself can
cause self-censorship:
With the view toward protection against liability, there is a tendency to resolve all
doubts against the company and to make things look as bleak as possible....
[E]xperienced counsel, guided at least in part by their knowledge of the SEC staff
attitudes, traditionally lean to a very conservative presentation. They avoid glow-
ing adjectives, subjective evaluations and predictions about the future. The pro-
spectus is limited to provable statements of historic fact. The layman frequently
complains that all the glamor and romance has been lost.
Id. The threat of criminal sanction is a further element of chilling, particularly because SEC
procedure can, in effect, shift the burden of proof against the issuer. See supra note 127.
The issuer's fear of adverse publicity has also been cited as an effective Commission
weapon. See, e.g., Freedman, A Civil Libertarian Looks at Securities Regulation, 35 OHIO
ST. L.J. 280, 284 (1974); Gellhorn, Adverse Publicity by Administrative Agencies, 86 HAV.
L. REV. 1380, 1406 n.107 (1973); Lacy, Adverse Publicity and SEC Enforcement Procedure,
46 FORDHAM L. REV. 435, 449-51 (1977). Lastly, it has been argued that companies do not
assert first amendment rights because they wish to avoid getting "on the v,ong side" of the
SEC. See Lewin, supra note 3, at D2, col. 3 (quoting Floyd Abrams).
130 Joseph H. Sharlitt, attorney for the Wall St. Publishing Institute, Inc., referring to
the Investment Advisers Act as a "classic case of prior restraint," protested that "[y]ou can't
publish until you are not only registered but comply with their rules." Noble, supra note 3,
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promulgated thereunder, 132 provide another salient illustration of
the censorial function of the Commission. Under section 14, mater-
ials relating to proxy solicitations and tender offers must be filed
with the SEC before they are made public.13 These materials are
subject to detailed content regulation, 3 4 and the Commission is
empowered to ensure strict adherence to the regulations. 35
The significant constitutional distinction between the Invest-
ment Advisers Act and the 1933 and 1934 Acts, however, is that
the latter two do not regulate anything that is arguably pure first
amendment speech. Communications subject to SEC licensing and
censorship under the 1933 and 1934 Acts may properly be classi-
fied as commercial speech. 6 Although distinguishable from the
at D2, col. 1.
... 15 U.S.C. § 78n (1982).
132 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14a-1 to 240.14f-1 (1984).
"1 15 U.S.C. § 78n (1982). Section 14(a) of the 1934 Act, which regulates the solicita-
tion of proxies, provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, by the use of the mails or by any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce or of any facility of a national securities
exchange or otherwise, in .contravention of such rules and regulations as the Com-
mission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the
protection of investors, to solicit or to permit the use of his name to solicit any
proxy or consent or authorization in respect of any [registered] security ....
Id. § 78n(a). Section 14(d), added in 1968 by the Williams Act, Pub. L. No. 90-439, § 3, 82
Stat. 454, 456 (1968), makes it unlawful to use the mails, interstate commerce, or a national
securities exchange "to make a tender offer for, or a request or invitation for tenders of, any
class of any [registered] equity security," if upon consummation of the deal the offeror
would be the beneficial owner of more than 5% of that class, unless the offeror has filed
with the Commission a copy of the offer or request or invitation. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(1)
(1982).
All requests or invitations for tenders or advertisements making a tender offer or
requesting or inviting tenders of such a security shall be filed . . . and shall con-
tain such . . .information . . . as the Commission may by rules and regulations
prescribe.
Id. Section 14(e) gives the Commission broad authority to prevent the making of any false
or misleading statements or omissions in any of the documents filed under § 14. See id. §
78n(e).
1'34 See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14a-3, 240.14a-101, 240.14a-102 (1984) (content require-
ments for proxy materials); id. § 240.14d-6 (content requirements for tender offer materi-
als). Rule 14a-9, which regulates proxy solicitations, sets forth illustrations of what "may be
misleading," including predictions about future market values, defamatory opinions, and
predictions about the results of the solicitation. Id. § 240.14a-9.
13I The Commission may obtain injunctions and writs of mandamus from federal dis-
trict courts, and may threaten potential violators with criminal sanctions. See 15 U.S.C. §
78u(d), (e) (1982).
136 See, e.g., In re W.T. Grant Co., [1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1
97,636, at 98,407-08 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 1980) (proxy solicitation letter is commercial
speech); Goodale, supra note 3, at 4, col. 1 (prospectus is nothing more than an
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"classic examples" of commercial speech-product and service ad-
vertisements'l5 -promotional information about securities fits
within the parameters of the commercial speech concept.13 Pro-
spectuses, proxy solicitations, and communications about tender
offers are all propositions of commercial transactions, and all relate
to the economic interests of both the speaker and the audience. 39
More significantly, they are communicated by potential parties to
the proposed transaction-that is, by persons who possess the "ex-
tensive knowledge" and "economic self-interest" that renders com-
mercial speech "more durable" and less likely to be chilled than
other forms of speech. 4 ' Under current first amendment law,
therefore, these forms of communication deserve only the limited
protection of a commercial speech analysis.' 4 '
Application of the Central Hudson Test
Since the 1933 and 1934 Acts regulate only commercial speech,
the proper test for their constitutional validity is the four-part
analysis set forth in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Pub-
lic Service Commission. 42 As it is lawful to effectuate transactions
in securities, and, because advertisements and solicitations to buy
and sell securities are neither generally nor inherently mislead-
ing, 43 the first prong of the Central Hudson test is satisfied. The
advertisement).
I" See Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376,
385 (1973).
138 See supra notes 94-111 and accompanying text.
139 See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 561-62
(1980); In re W.T. Grant Co., [1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 97,636, at
98,407-08 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 1980).
4o See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564 n.6; Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia
Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771-72 n.24 (1976).
14 See infra notes 142-54 and accompanying text.
142 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980); see supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text.
W3 There is some difficulty satisfying the "not misleading" requirement of the Central
Hudson test, since the Commission surely would assert that it prohibits only false, mislead-
ing, and fraudulent speech. However, the Commission licenses and censors all speech about
securities, scrutinizing the true and accurate along with the false and misleading. See supra
notes 118-35 and accompanying text. Unless it is assumed that speech about securities is
inherently misleading, cf. Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1979) (use of trade name in
practice of optometry is inherently deceptive); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S.
447, 464-65 (1978) ("ambulance chasing" by an attorney is inherently susceptible to over-
reaching), it is submitted that the SEC clearly regulates speech that is not misleading. Cf.
Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 153-54 (1959) (fear of subsequent liability for obscenity
leads to prior restraint in the form of self-censorship by all publishers). But see In re W.T.
Grant Co., [1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) T 97,636, at 98,407 (Bankr.
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Commission undoubtedly fulfills the second requirement of the
test by asserting the substantial governmental interest in prevent-
ing fraud and other abuses in the securities markets." When the
Commission encroaches upon first amendment rights, however, any
interference with free speech must directly advance the asserted
governmental interest and be no more restrictive than necessary." 5
Thus, the third and fourth parts of the Central Hudson analysis
present the most serious challenges to the constitutionality of SEC
licensing and censorship under the 1933 and 1934 Acts.
Although the registration and disclosure requirements of the
securities laws originally were enacted to advance the governmen-
tal interest in preventing securities fraud and promoting full and
fair disclosure, 146 recent commentary and research have challenged
the continuing validity of these bases for SEC oversight."' Thus,
S.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 1980) (granting injunction of proxy solicitation letter).
144 See, e.g., SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963). The very
purposes of the 1933 and 1934 Acts, as stated by their respective preambles, are to "provide
full and fair disclosure," "to prevent frauds," 48 Stat. 74, 74 (1933), and "to prevent inequi-
table and unfair practices," 48 Stat. 881, 881 (1934).
,45 Cf. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 569-72 (invalidating ban on promotional advertising
by electric utility as more restrictive than necessary).
'41 See supra note 144.
"I See, e.g., G. STIGLER, THE CITIZEN AND THE STATE: ESSAYS ON REGULATION 28-29, 78-
99 (1975); Benston, An Appraisal of the Costs and Benefits of Government-Required Dis-
closure: SEC and FTC Requirements, 41 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1977, at 30, 42-54;
Kripke, The Myth of the Informed Layman, 28 Bus. LAW. 631, 631-34 (1973). It has been
argued that the disclosure laws have assured no more information for purchasers than would
an unregulated market. See, e.g., H. KRIPKE, THE SEC AND CORPORATE DISCLOSURE: REGULA-
TION IN SEARCH OF A PURPOSE 117-33 (1979); Benston, supra, at 51-53; Lothian, The Role of
Government in the Securities Market, 33 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1587, 1591-95 (1979). Indeed,
unlike the era during which the securities laws were enacted, the modern market is domi-
nated by sophisticated individual and institutional investors. See Wolfson, A Critique of the
Securities and Exchange Commission, 30 EMORY L.J. 119, 134-37 (1981). Those individuals
who buy and sell securities, it has been argued, are at least as sophisticated in the securities
markets as are consumers in the markets of other industries subject to much less regulation.
See Lothian, supra, at 1594; Stephan, supra note 3, at 94-95. For example, it has been
argued that SEC regulation of proxy contests has underestimated the intelligence of
shareholders:
A proxy contest is much like a political contest. There are exaggerated denuncia-
tions of the opposition, lofty exaltation of oneself and the always present tendency
to state issues in terms of black and white when many of us know they are often a
murky gray. But the American people are used to this type of bombast in election-
eering and they are not easily taken in by it. . . . [T]he American public [should
not] be bored to death by speeches and statements by contestants written by their
lawyers, and reading like a marine insurance policy.
Stephan, supra note 3, at 94-95.
It has been argued further that expansion of SEC regulation has rendered the market
so inefficient that long run costs have been inflated and opportunities for corporate mischief
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the Commission may fail to satisfy even the third requirement of
the Central Hudson test, which requires that commercial speech
regulation directly advance the governmental interest involved. 48
Assuming the third part of the analysis is satisfied, however,
SEC regulation must clear the fourth hurdle of Central Hudson: It
must be no more extensive than necessary to achieve the govern-
mental interest alleged. 14 9 This fourth prong of Central Hudson
adopts a test that is, it is submitted, indistinguishable from the
least-restrictive-alternative test used in analyzing encroachments
on pure first amendment speech. 50 Thus, it is suggested that the
constitutional validity of SEC prior restraint is highly questiona-
ble, since the Court's injection of a form of the least-restrictive-
alternative test into the commercial speech arena would be incon-
sistent with anything but the traditional "heavy presumption
against" prior restraint.'5 '
and incompetency have been opened. See Wolfson, supra, at 134, 157; see also H. KRIPKE,
supra, at 106-14 (examining the costs of excessive SEC regulation); Lothian, supra, at 1588,
1590, 1594, 1595 (noting costliness of conforming to Commission rules and regulations).
Thus, regulation of communication about securities may be unnecessary, and perhaps con-
trary to the public interest. See Lothian, supra, at 1588, 1595; Wolfson, supra, at 157. For a
recent exposition of the argument that mandatory disclosure has been unhelpful and ineffi-
cient, see Easterbrook & Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection of Investors, 70
VA. L. REv. 669, 692-96, 707-14 (1984).
14 Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
149 Id.
150 See Barrett, supra note 99, at 199 (suggesting, even before Central Hudson was
decided, that adoption of the least-restrictive-alternative test may be "constitutionally com-
pelled"); see also Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 591 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (protection of
commercial speech is now "virtually indistinguishable from that of noncommercial speech);
J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 1, at 923 (commercial speech now seems to
receive full first amendment protection). The least-restrictive-alternative test requires that,
where government regulation impedes freedom of speech, the regulation must be no more
restrictive of speech than necessary. See, e.g., Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 148-
49 (1943) (striking down ordinance that prohibited knocking on doors and ringing doorbells
to deliver handbills because there were less restrictive alternatives available); Lovell v. City
of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 451 (1938) (license requirement for distribution of leaflets was too
restrictive in that it reached all kinds of literature); cf. United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258,
267-68 (1967) (statute that interferes with first amendment freedom of association must be
the least drastic alternative); Jacob Siegel Co. v. FTC, 327 U.S. 608, 612 (1946) (use of trade
name is a valuable business asset which, even if deceptive, should not be destroyed if there
exists a less restrictive alternative of requiring qualifying language to clarify the deception).
'" See New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (per curiam)
(quoting Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963)); supra note 13.
Some of the Court's commercial speech opinions have suggested that the rule against
prior restraint might not apply to regulation of commercial speech. See, e.g., Central Hud-
son, 447 U.S. at 571 n.13 (quoting Virginia Board, 425 U.S. at 771-72 n.24). This aspect of
the lower level of protection afforded commercial speech seems at the very least to be
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The ultimate question, it is suggested, is whether SEC regula-
tion of speech is to be scrutinized under the standards, applicable
to other regulation of speech, or whether the Commission is to re-
ceive preferential treatment. In other contexts, prior restraints in
the forms of licensing and censorship have failed to satisfy the
least-restrictive-alternative test,152 a test that now appears to apply
not only to restrictions on pure speech, but also to those on com-
mercial speech. Courts consistently have stated that the proper
method of monitoring speech-even speech wholly outside first
amendment protection-is not prior restraint, but subsequent
punishment. 53 Of course, damages suffered by those misled by
communications about securities should not be trivialized. It is
submitted, however, that unless courts are inclined to give greater
priority to the prevention of such financial injury than to the pre-
vention of the types of injury inflicted by other forms of destruc-
tive speech, 54 the SEC should not be given preferential treatment;
greatly undermined by the Central Hudson requirement that restrictions on commercial
speech be no more extensive than necessary. 447 U.S. at 566. Thus, it is submitted that by
incorporating into its commercial speech analysis the least-restrictive-alternative test, the
Court has negated its suggestions that the rule against prior restraints might not apply to
commercial speech regulation.
"' See, e.g., Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 150-56 (1969) (al-
though time, place, and manner regulation on the use of public streets is permissible, it may
not be done in a way that unnecessarily interferes with first amendment rights); Smith v.
California, 361 U.S. 147, 153-55 (1959) (imposition of absolute criminal liability for mere
possession, without scienter, of obscene material interferes too much with freedom of
speech); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 160-65 (1939) (licensing scheme is too restrictive
of first amendment rights); see also supra notes 13-15 and accompanying text (discussing
judicial distaste for licensing, censorship, and other prior restraints).
"I See, e.g., Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 69-70 (1963) (obscenity); Near
v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 713-17 (1931) (defamation).
Our judicial system, wisely or unwisely, has adopted an extraordinarily expansive
construction of a preferred first amendment. See supra notes 1 & 13-15 and accompanying
text. As a result, our system tolerates the publication of various forms of offensive speech.
For example, courts refuse to enjoin the publication of defamatory speech despite the
destructive effects the publication might have on the lifestyle of the victim. See, e.g., Near v.
Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 713-17 (1931). Similarly, courts refuse to enjoin racist group defa-
mation, despite its perpetuation of a legacy of prejudice, discrimination, and hostility
against its targets. See, e.g., Sambo's Restaurants, Inc. v. City of Ann Arbor, 663 F.2d 686,
694-95 (6th Cir. 1981) (conceding that the use by a restaurant of the name "Sambo's" is a
"pernicious racial stereotype of blacks as inferior," but holding that the right to use the
name is protected commercial speech and could not be waived by contract with city); Collin
v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197, 1202-06 (7th Cir.) (conceding that proposed Nazi demonstration
would "seriously disturb" the residents of predominantly Jewish village in which it was
scheduled, but holding that ordinances prohibiting demonstration were unconstitutional),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 916 (1978). Persuasive arguments have been made that the suppres-
sion of such speech is warranted, or at least permissible. See State Div. of Human Rights v.
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the Commission should be limited to punishment of speech that is
proved false or misleading after publication.
CONCLUSION
The purpose of this Note has been to analyze the system of
securities regulation under the first amendment as it is currently
interpreted by the Supreme Court. The Lowe, Suter, and Wall
Street Publishing cases have helped bring to the forefront the fun-
damental conflict between an expansive construction of the free
speech clause and the extraordinary regulatory power exercised by
the SEC. This Note has suggested that, although first amendment
issues in securities law have been litigated only recently, SEC re-
striction of speech is pervasive, and no longer can be ignored. In
one of the first decisions to limit SEC authority, the Supreme
Court cautioned against permitting such administrative agencies
"gradually to extend their powers by encroachments-even petty
encroachments-upon the fundamental rights."' 55 It would be-
hoove courts to heed that warning today when evaluating the con-
stitutionality of SEC prior restraint.
Russell Gerard Ryan
McHarris Gift Center, 52 N.Y.2d 813, 814-16, 418 N.E.2d 393, 393-94, 436 N.Y.S.2d 878,
878-79 (1980) (Cooke, C.J., dissenting); id. at 816-17, 418 N.E. 2d at 394-95, 436 N.Y.S.2d at
879-80 (Jasen, J., dissenting). See generally O'Neil, Second Thoughts on the First Amend-
ment, 13 N.M.L. REV. 577 (1983).
Courts are also exceedingly reluctant to permit prior restraint of obscene and porno-
graphic material, despite the generally accepted view that such speech is devoid of all social
value and harmful to the moral fabric of society. See, e.g., Vance v. Universal Amusement
Co., 445 U.S. 308, 315-17 (1980) (per curiam); Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58-60
(1965); Marcus v. Search Warrant of Property, 367 U.S. 717, 729-33 (1961). "Surely report-
ers and investment advisers are entitled to as much protection under the First Amendment
as pornographers." Karmel, supra note 3, at 2, col. 5.
Indeed, the Supreme Court has intimated that only speech that would seriously and
immediately endanger national security may be enjoined, Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697,
716 (1931) (dictum) (government may prevent the publication of information concerning the
movement of troops or supplies during wartime); see Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348, 353-58
(1980) (upholding military regulation requiring advance approval from commander before
circulation of any petitions on Air Force bases), and yet in practice the Court has been
hesitant even in this type of case, see New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713,
714 (1971) (per curiam) (refusing to enjoin publication of Pentagon Papers).
155 Jones v. SEC, 298 U.S. 1, 24 (1936).
